杨瑞凤 刘文婷 译
A Theory of Personality Change
Eugene T. Gendlin, Ph.D.
University of Chicago
Chapter four in: Personality Change,
Philip Worchel & Donn Byrne (Eds.), New York: John Wiley & Sons (1964)
I am grateful to Malcolm A. Brown for many helpful and clarifying discussions, which greatly aided the process of writing this chapter, and to Dr. Sidney M. Jourard, Marilyn Geist, Dr. William Wharton, Joe T. Hart, David Le Roy, and Ruth Nielsenn for their valuable comments and editorial help.
尤金 T 簡德林博士
Philip Worchel & Donn Byrne（合編） ，紐約： John Wiley ＆ Sons出版（ 1964 ）
我感謝Malcolm A. Brown許多有益的討論和澄清，這大大有助於本章的寫作過程，也感謝Dr. Sidney M. Jourard, Marilyn Geist, Dr. William Wharton, Joe T. Hart, David Le Roy, 和 Ruth Nielsenn的寶貴意見和編輯上的幫助。
After a few pages which state two main problems and two observations, a theory of personality change will be presented. The theory is another step in the continuing work on "experiencing" (Gendlin, 1957, 1962b; Gendlin and Zimring, 1955). The theory of experiencing provides a frame of reference in which theoretical considerations are viewed in a new way.
經過幾頁陳述兩個主要問題和兩個觀察，一個關於人格變化的理論將要面世。該理論是對“體驗”的持續研究中邁出的又一步（簡德林， 1957 ， 1962b ; 簡德林和Zimring ， 1955）。這個關於體驗的理論，提供了一個以新的方式看待理論思考的參考框架。
A theory requires terms, defined words with which to specify observations, and a formulation of a chain of theoretical hypotheses. The theory presented here is developed within this basic structure, and special notice should be given to the new terms which are introduced and defined. These terms are pointed out and numbered. (We can have a genuine theory only with carefully defined terms, and only by using defined terms can we later modify, improve, and extend theory.)
一個理論需要術語，定義來具體說明觀察結果，以及一連串理論假設的建構。這裏提出的理論是在這一基本框架上發展出來的，並應特別注意這裏介紹和界定的新術語。這些術語被命名和編號。 （我們可以有一個只有仔細界定的術語的真正的理論，並且只有通過使用定義的術語，我們可以以後修改，改進和擴展該理論。 ）
PROBLEMS AND OBSERVATIONS存在的問題及意見
In most theories, the static content-and-structure aspects of personality are primary, and therefore personality change is an especially difficult problem. The present theoretical frame of reference is especially suited to account for change, since it employs concepts that apply to the experiencing process, and to the relationships between that process and content aspects of personality.
Personality Theory and Personality Change人格理論與人格變化
Personality theories have chiefly been concerned with the factors that determine and explain different individuals' personalities as they are, and the factors which have brought about the given personality. What is called personality maintains its character despite circumstances. Aspects of an individual fail to puzzle us if his current situation explains them. We do not even attribute it to his personality when an individual shows all sorts of undesirable behavior under overwhelmingly bad circumstances, or when he becomes likable and secure under the influence of events which (as we say) would make almost anybody likable and secure. What we do attribute to personality is the reverse: when an individual remains likable and secure under overwhelmingly bad circumstances, and when an individual remains afraid and in pain despite apparent opportunities and good luck. Thus, it could be said that, far from explaining personality change, our theories have been endeavoring to explain and define personality as that which tends not to change when one would expect change.
To some extent this view of personality as factors which resist change is justified. We usually think of a person as involving identity and continuity through time. However, the contents and patterns in the theories are a type of explanatory concept which renders change impossible by definition. The structure of personality (in theories) is formulated in such a way that it is said to maintain itself against all new experience which might alter it. The individual is viewed as a structured entity with defined contents. These explanatory concepts can explain only why an individual cannot change.
Personality theory, then, has concentrated upon the factors which explain why an individual is as he is, how he has become so, and how these factors maintain him so, despite circumstances, fortunes, and opportunities. Such explanatory concepts of content and structure tell us what prevents an individual from being changed by experience, what factors will force him forever (by dennition) to miss or distort everything that might change him unless (as we commonly say) his personality (somehow) changes first.
Since structure and content do tend to maintain themselves and distort present experience, we can account for personality change only if we can show exactly how this change resistance yields to change.
Theories in the past have not wanted to portray personality change as impossible. On the contrary, the theories assert that change does actually occur. The chief personality theories have sprung from psychotherapy--that is to say (when psychotherapy is successful), from ongoing personality change.
Quite paradoxically, as personality change occurs before their eyes and with their participation, therapists find their minds formulating what has been wrong. Even the individual, himself, as he searches into his feelings and expresses these, speaks as if the whole endeavor were to investigate what has been wrong--what has constituted the aspects of his personality which have prevented ordinary adaption and change. And, usually, such an individual becomes aware of much which, he then says, has been true all along but of which he has not been aware.
Thus, psychotherapy regularly gives us this observation of an individual "uncovering" or "becoming aware" of these stubborn contents and his previous inability to be aware of them. So well have the various personality theories formulated these contents and this self maintaining and censoring structure that, while we have concepts to explain what makes an individual as he is, we cannot formulate how he can change. Yet all the time the individual has been changing just these "uncovered" factors which we formulate in terms of static explanatory contents.
因此，心理治療定期讓我們觀察到個人“揭露”或“開始意識到”這些頑固的內容和他以前無法瞭解的。各種人格理論如此出色地建構了這些內容和這種自我維護和檢查結構，雖然我們能用概念來解釋是什麼讓一個人成為他，我們無法解釋他如何才能夠改變。然而，一直以來個人一直在改變的是這些“揭露”的事實，建構於靜態的解釋性的內容。 [ 1 ]
I will now present in more detail the two main ways in which much current formulation of personality makes change appear theoretically impossible. I call these two impossibilities "the repression paradigm," and "the content paradigm."
目前很多人格建構理論使得在理論上變化出現是不可能的。我現在將更詳細地討論兩種理論方式，我稱這兩個不可能為“壓抑範式”和“內容示範。” [ 2 ]
Since these theories, nevertheless, also assert that change does occur, I will then take up the two main ways in which theories attempt to account for change. I will try to show that theories usually cite two observations: a feeling process; and a certain personal relationship.
Most personality theories (in different words and with somewhat different meanings) share what I call the "repression paradigm." They agree that in an individual's early family relations he introjected certain values, according to which he was loved only if he felt and behaved in certain ways. Experiences which contradicted these demands on him came to be "repressed" (Freud), or "denied to awareness" (Rogers), or "not me" (Sullivan). Later, when the individual encounters experiences of this contradicting sort, he must either distort them or remain totally unaware of them. For, were he to notice the contradictory experiences, he would become intolerably anxious. The ego (Freud), or self-concept (Rogers), or self-dynamism (Sullivan), thus basically influences awareness and perception. This influence is termed "resistance" (Freud), or "defensiveness" (Rogers), or "security operation" (Sullivan), and a great deal of behavior is thereby explainable. A personality is as it is, and remains as it is, because it cannot take account of these experiences. Or if, somehow, repression is forcefully lifted and the individual is made to become aware of these experiences, the ego will "lose control," the self will "disintegrate," and intolerable "uncanny emotions" will occur. In psychosis, it is said, the individual is aware of such experiences and the ego or self-organization has indeed broken down.
大多數人格理論（以不同的語言描述和有些不同的含義）都有我所說的“壓抑範例”。 他們一致認為，在個人的早期家庭關係中，他內射了某些價值觀，他只有以某種方式去感受和行為才能獲得愛。與這些對他的要求相矛盾的體驗被“壓抑” 了（佛洛德） ，或“否認去意識到” （羅傑斯） ，或“不是我” （沙利文）。後來，當個人遇到這類矛盾的體驗，他必須歪曲它們或完全不知道它們。因為如果他發現了矛盾的經驗，他將變得難以忍受地焦慮。自我ego（佛洛德） ，或自體概念self-concept（羅傑斯） ，或自我動力self-dynamism（沙利文） ，從而從根本上影響意識和知覺。這種影響稱為“阻抗resistance” （佛洛德） ，或“防禦defensiveness” （羅傑斯） ，或“安全操作security operation” （沙利文） ，以及用來解釋大量的行為。人格就是它所是的，並且保持它自己，因為它無法考慮到這些經驗。或如，不知怎麼地，壓抑被強行解除，個體被迫認識到這些經驗，自我將“失去控制” ，自體會“分解”，不能容忍的“詭異的情緒”會發生。在精神病裏，據說，個體是知道有這些經驗的，但自我或自體組織確實已經破裂。
If the individual needed merely to be reminded, or to have the "repressed" factors called to his notice, he would soon be straightened out. There are always helpful or angry people who attempt this, and many situations grossly demand attention to these factors. The individual, however, represses not only the given factors within him but also anything outside him which would relate to these factors and remind him of them. He misunderstands or reinterprets so as to prevent himself from noticing the aspects of events and persons which would bring these factors to his awareness.
如果個人需要的僅僅是提醒，或有“壓抑”的事實要讓他注意到，他將很快被理順。總有一些樂於助人的人或憤怒的人會來嘗試這樣做，而且許多情況下強烈要求關注這些事實。然而，個人不僅壓抑這些給出的事實，還會壓抑外界涉及到這些事實並提醒他這些事實的事物。 [ 3 ]他誤解或重新解釋，以防止自己發現會讓他意識到這些事實的各個方面的事件和人。
Thus, the specific personality structure maintains itself and change is theoretically impossible. Whatever would change the individual in the necessary respects is distorted or goes unnoticed just to that extent and in those respects in which it could lift the repression and change him.
Now, this explanation (shared in some way, as I have tried to indicate, by the major personality theories of the day ) is based on the striking way in which the individual during psychotherapy becomes aware of what (so he now says) he has long felt but has not known that he felt. Moreover, the individual realizes how powerfully these previously unaware experiences have affected his feelings and behavior. So many individuals have now reported this that there is no longer much doubt that it is a valid observation. The open question is how we are to formulate it theoretically.
現在，這一解釋（以某種方式得到共識，正如我現在試圖舉例的主要的人格理論表明[ 4 ]）的基礎是驚人的，在個人心理治療中逐漸察覺到的（而且他現在也是這麼說的），他長期以來一直感覺到，但卻不知道他感覺到的。此外，個人發現這些以前沒有意識到的體驗是如何有力，已影響到他的感情和行為。因此，許多人現在都這麼報告，不再質疑這是否是一個有效的觀察。存在的問題仍然是我們在理論上該如何建構它。
Once we formulate theory along the lines of the repression paradigm, we cannot then blithely turn around and "explain" personality change as a "becoming aware" of the previously repressed. Once we have shown how anything will be distorted which tends to bring these experiences to awareness, we cannot then consider it an explanation to simply assert that personality change is (by definition supposedly impossible) a becoming aware. Change happens. But, to say that is not to offer an explanation-it is only to state the problem. We may take the "repression paradigm" to be one basic aspect of personality change-one of the two basic factors with which this chapter will be concerned. To account for personality change, we will have to account for how this crucial becoming aware really does occur, and then we will have to go back and reformulate our theory of repression and the unconscious.
The second basic aspect of personality change (and the second way in which current modes of formulating make change theoretically impossible) concerns the view of personality as made up of various "contents." By "contents" I mean any defined entities, whether they are called "experiences," "factors," "S-R bonds," "needs," "drives," "motives," "appraisals," "traits," "self-concepts," "anxieties," "motivational systems," "infantile fixations," "developmental failures," or whatever.
人格改變的第二個基本方面（第二種目前的建構模式使改變在理論上不可能）關注到人格觀點由不同的“內容”組成。提到“內容”，我的意思是任何定義的實體，不管他們是所謂的“體驗” ， “因素” ， “S-R聯繫 （S-R bonds）” ， “需求” ， “驅動” ， “動機” ， “評估” ， “特徵” ， “自我概念“ ， ”焦慮“ ， ”激勵制度“ ， ”嬰幼兒固著 “ ， ”發展的失敗“ ，或者別的什麼東西。
If we are to understand personality change, we must understand how these personality constituents can change in nature.
To account for this change in the nature of contents, we need a type of definition (explanatory constructs) which also can change. We cannot explain change in the nature of the content when our theory specifically defines personality only as content. Such theory can formulate what needs to be changed, and later it can also formulate what has changed, and into what it has changed; but it will remain theoretically unexplained how such change is possible, so long as all our explanations are in terms of concepts of this or that defined content.
We require some kind of more basic personality variable to formulate an account of how, under what conditions, and through what process, change in the nature of contents can occur.
Thus, for example, chemistry defines the elements in terms of more basic activities of electrons and protons, and thereby we can account for the subatomic processes by which elements engage in chemical change reactions, and through which an element can be bombarded with subatomic particles and turned into a different element. Without these concepts, which view elements as motions of something more basic, we could not explain the chemical and atomic change we observe, nor operationally study and define the conditions under which it occurs. We could state only that at t1 the test tube had certain contents A, B, while at t2 the contents were C, D. Only if A, B, C, D, are not themselves the ultimate explanatory concepts can we expect to explain changes from one to another. And so it is with personality change. If our ultimate explanatory constructs are "contents;" we cannot explain the change in the nature of just these contents.
因此，例如，化學定義了更基本的電子和質子的活動方面的內容，從而我們可以解釋亞原子過程，其中元素進行化學變化的反應，並可以通過一個元素與亞原子粒子爆炸，變成不同的元素。如果沒有這些概念，將元素視為一些更基本的物質的運動，我們無法解釋我們觀察到的化學和原子的變化，也無法操作性地研究和確定在何種條件下會發生。我們只可以聲明， t1試管有某些內容A ， B ，而T2試管有內容C，D。只有A,B,C,D本身不是最終的解釋性概念，我們才可以期待解釋從一個變化到另一個。人格改變同樣如此。如果我們最終的解釋性建構是“內容”;我們不能解釋這些內容性質的變化。
Our conclusion here is not simply that defined contents of personality do not exist. Rather, it is that if we define personality as contents and in no further, more basic way, then we cannot expect to use the same concepts to explain just how these contents change. And, inasmuch as it will have been just these contents which define the personality (and the respects in which change must occur if it is to be important personality change), exactly this theoretically impossible task is posed when personality theories come to explain change.
For example, during psychotherapy the patient finally comes to realize these essential contents (they will be conceptualized in whatever the vocabulary of the particular theory the psychotherapist uses). He realizes now that he has been full of "hostility," or that he has felt and acted from "partial, fixated sexual desires;" or that he "hates his father," or that he is "passive-dependent," or was "never loved as a child." "Now what?;" he asks. How do you change such contents? No way is given. The fact that these contents actually do change is our good fortune. The theories explain the personality in terms of these defined contents, these "experiences," or "needs," or "lacks." The theories cannot explain how these contents melt and lose their character to become something of a different character. Yet they do.
例如，在心理治療中，病人終於認識到這些基本內容（它們將被心理治療師使用的具體理論辭彙所定義）。他現在意識到，他曾經充滿了“敵意”，或者，他感受到並根據“部分的固著的性欲”來行動，或者，他“恨他的父親”，或他是“被動依賴的” ，或“從來沒有被象孩子一樣地愛過。“ ”現在該怎麼做？ “他問。你如何改變這種內容？沒有辦法。這些內容真的改變的話就是我們的運氣好。理論用這些特定的內容解釋人格，這些“經驗”或“需要”或“缺失”。理論不能解釋這些內容如何融化和失去其性質，成為了一種不同的特點。然而，它們會發生。
Our second basic problem of personality change, then, is this "content paradigm." The question is, "In what way should the nature of personality definitions change so that we can arrive at a means of defining that will fit the process of change in personality contents?" In answering this, we will describe something more basic or ultimate than defined contents. Then we will consider how defined contents arise in this more ultimate personality process.
1. Major personality change involves some sort of intense affective or feeling process occurring in the individual.
2. Major personality change occurs nearly always in the context of an ongoing personal relationship.
當發生重大的人格變化時，通常會觀察到激烈的，情感的，內心感受到的事件。 我想給這一人格改變的情感層面的名稱是“感覺進程”。用“感覺”而不用“情感”這個詞，因為“感覺”通常是指個人具體感知到的。人格改變中，個人直接覺得一種內在的再造。他自己的概念和結構成為部分非結構化的體驗，他的感覺體驗（felt experiencing）有時超過了他的智慧把握。
In various contexts it has been noted that major personality change requires not only intellectual or actional operations, but also this felt process. For instance, psychotherapists (of whatever orientation) often discuss the presence or absence of this feeling process in a particular case. They discuss whether the individual, in a given psychotherapy hour, is engaged in "merely" intellectualizing, or whether (as they phrase it) he is "really" engaged in psychotherapy. The former they consider a waste of time or a defense, and they predict that no major personality change will result from it. The latter they consider promising of personality change.
在各種情況中，已經注意到的是，主要的人格改變不僅需要智力上的或行為上的實踐，而且是這樣一種感覺進程（felt process）。舉例來說，（任何取向的）心理諮詢師經常討論在某個案例中這種感覺進程的存在或不存在。他們討論是否這個人，在某個治療小時，是否“僅僅在”在進行理智化，還是（就像他們說的）他是“真的”進入了心理治療。前者他們認為是浪費時間或是防禦，他們預測[ 5 ] ，不會有任何重大的人格變化發生。後者他們認為有希望的人格改變。
Now, although this difference is universally discussed, it is most often phrased so unclearly, and the words following "merely" ("merely" intellectualizing, defending, avoiding, externalizing, etc.), and the words following "really" ("really" engaged, facing, dealing with) are so undefined that we may as well simply refer to this difference as the difference between "merely" and "really." Although it may not be phrased well, what is always meant of referred to by "really" is a feeling process which is absent when something is termed "merely."
現在，儘管這種差異是被廣泛討論的，但經常只是模糊的措辭，並在“僅僅”後面跟著的辭彙 （ “僅僅是”理智化，防禦，回避，講述外部事件等），以及“真正”後面的辭彙 （ “真正地“參與，面對，處理）是如此地不確定，我們可能也會將差異說成是“僅僅”和“真正”之間的差異。雖然可能這個說法也不一定很好，所提到的“真正”總是意味著一個感覺的過程，當說“僅僅”時是指缺失這個感覺的過程。
A similar distinction between "merely" and "really" is talked about in education: There has always been much concern with the contrast between "mere" rote learnings of facts and "really" learning something (making it one's own, becoming able to "integrate," "apply," and "creatively elaborate" it).
與“僅僅”與“真正”之間的區別類似的是談論教育：一直以來備受關注於對比“僅僅的”死記硬背事實和“真正”學習一些東西（使它成為自己的，能夠“整合“的， ”應用“和”創造性地推敲“它的） 。
"Really" learning is predicted to result in observable behavior changes, while "mere" rote learning is predicted to result in little (or different) behavior change. The learning process is said to differ in the two instances, depending upon the degree of the individual's "internal motivation," his way of "taking the new material in," his "application of himself to what he learns," his genuine grasp of meanings. These metaphoric phrases indicate that, here again during learning, the difference between "really" and "merely" refers to a certain participation of the individual's feelings in the learning process.
“真正的”學習結果預計有可見的行為變化，而“僅僅是”死記硬背將導致很小（或不同）的行為變化。這兩種實例的學習過程不同，這取決於個人的“內部動機” ，他獲取“新材料”的方式，他“對自己所學的應用”，他真正把握的意義。這些隱喻詞語表明，在這裏的學習過程中， “真正”和“僅僅”之間的區別是指在學習過程中參與的某種程度的個人的感情的不同。
Let me give some further aspects of this observation from psychotherapy.
An Adlerian therapist some years ago told me: "Of course interpretation is not enough. Of course the person doesn't change only because of the wisdoms which the therapist tells him. But no technique really expresses what makes the change itself. The change comes through some kind of emotional digesting; but then you must admit that none of us understand what that is."
Therapists often miss this fact. They labor' at helping the individual to a better explanation of what is wrong with him, yet, when asked how the individual is to change this now clearly explained maladaption, nothing very clear is said. Somehow, knowing his problem, the individual should change, yet knowing is not the process of changing.
A good diagnostician, perhaps with the aid of a few psychometric tests, can often give a very accurate and detailed description and explanation of an individual's personality. Therapist and client often both know, after such testing and a few interviews, a good deal of what is wrong and what needs to be changed. Quite often, after two years of therapeutic interviews, the description and explanation which was (or could have been) given at the outset appears in retrospect to have been quite accurate. Yet it is clear that there is a major difference between knowing the conceptual explanation of personality (which one can devise in a few hours) and the actual feeling process of changing (which often requires years). Relatively little has been said about this process, how one may observe and measure it, and just in what theoretical way this feeling process functions to permit personality change.
一個良好的診斷，在一些心理測驗的幫助下，可能往往可以給一個非常準確而詳細的說明和解釋一個人的人格。在這種試驗和一些訪談後，治療師和客戶通常都會知道，大量的關於哪里出錯了，哪些需要改變。往往，經過兩年的治療訪談，回顧一開始給出（或可以給出）的描述和解釋是相當準確的。然而，很清楚知道人格的概念性解釋（我們可以在幾個小時內弄明白）與實際改變中的感覺過程（這往往需要幾年）有重大的區別。我們較少談論這個過程， [ 6 ]如何觀察和測量它，在理論上這種感覺進程功能如何允許人格的變化。
Just as the feeling process is observed as essential in personality change-while little is said to delineate, observably define, or theoretically account for it-so also the personal relationship is always cited. Can theory define this enormous and critical difference which it makes to the individual to live in relation to another person?
We observe that when the individual thinks about his experiences and emotions by himself, there is often little change. We observe that when he speaks about these things to some other people, equally little change occurs.
However, when we come to the "therapeutic" or "effective" personal relationship, we say that "suggestion," or "libidinal support," or "approval and reinforcement," or the other person's "therapeutic attitudes," or the "conversation between the two unconsciousnesses," somehow obviates the factors which otherwise shape all his experiences and personal relations to keep the individual as he is. Somehow, now, he is said to "become aware" of what he previously could not be aware of, he is "influenced" by suggestions, he "overcomes" the transference, his "libidinal balance" is altered, he somehow now "perceives the attitudes" of the therapist, where he has always distorted and anticipated the attitudes of others. This is really the problem, not the explanation, of personality change.
然而，當我們看到“治療性”或“有效”的個人關係時，我們說， “建議” 或 “力比多投注的支持”， 或 “批准和鼓動”，或其他人的“治療性的態度” ，或“兩個無意識之間的對話“ ，以某種方式消除了一些因素，而這些因素塑造了他原有的經驗和所有的使他保持他原樣的個人關係。不管怎樣，現在，他“變得意識到”他以前可能不知道的，他是受建議的“影響”的，他“克服”了移情，他的“力比多的平衡”被改變了，他現在不知怎麼地“察覺了治療師的態度“，而以前他總是扭曲和按照預期去理解他人的態度。這是真正的問題，而不是對人格改變的解釋。
But we do observe that almost always these changes occur in the context of a personal relationship. Some definitions of the kind of relationship which does (and the kind which does not) effect personality change have been offered (Rogers, 1957, 1959b). Very little has been said about how relationship events affect the conditions making for repression and the nature of contents, so that these alter.
但是，我們的確看到，幾乎這些變化總是發生在個人人際關係的背景下。已經有了對這種影響（或不影響）人格改變的人際關係的一些定義（羅傑斯， 1957 ， 1959b ）。很少有人討論人際關係事件如何造成壓抑和內容本質的環境，以便使這些改變發生。
So far we have formulated two problems of personality change and we have then cited two observations; the feeling process in the individual; and the personal relationship.
Our two observations and our two problems are related: simply, we may say that, while it is theoretically impossible for the individual to become aware of what he must repress and to change his personality contents into other contents, we observe that both occur when the individual is engaged in a deep and intense feeling process and in the context of a personal relationship. We need a theoretical account of this observed possibility, and we need to reformulate the theory of repression and the definitions of personality constituents, so that observed changes can be theoretically formulated.